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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that some recent developments of EU constitutionalism may be better 
understood by relying on a classic term of US federalism. This term is police power that was 
widely used in the 18
th
-19
th
 century US constitutional discourse. In the first part, in order to 
point out the relationship between the actual EU developments and the concept of police 
power the paper presents and discusses its various meanings in US constitutional law. In the 
second part the paper critically examines whether Article 4 paras (1) and (2) TEU 
incorporated into the founding treaties following the Lisbon reforms may be interpreted as the 
emergence of the concept of police power in this context. In sum, the paper submits that the 
first judgments of the ECJ touching upon these Articles will answer the question if the 
concept of police power is really relevant in the EU constitutional discourse, but the use of 
term of police power can considerably contribute to the conceptual understanding. 
 
1. The sui generis legal nature of the EU 
 2 
When attempting to clarify the nature of the European Union, legal scholarship seems very 
reluctant to apply federal terms. On the contrary, it has developed various sui generis 
concepts to describe the unique nature of both the post-World War II European integration 
and the European Union itself (cf. Schütze 2009, 1–10).  
On the one hand, it is easy to understand the main reasons behind this line of thinking. The 
first forms of integration had already been unique political and legal constructions, alloying 
intergovernmental, federative and supranational components from the very outset. The 
institutional system of the European Coal and Steel Community serves as a good example (cf. 
Alter-Steinberg 2007, 13). The High Authority had certain regulatory competences of 
supranational nature, while the Council provided considerable room for inter-state bargaining. 
In addition, the Assembly may be regarded as the seminal stage of a representative body as it 
had certain consultative competences in the early institutional setting.
1
 The developments of 
the decades that followed have rendered this picture even more complicated with the 
appearance of both novel institutions and inter-institutional mechanisms (see Bitsch-Loth 
2009). Furthermore, the emergence of a supranational legal order aiming to provide direct 
legal guarantees for the citizens of the member states also added a new element into this 
complexity. (Weiler 1990-1991, 2405–2431). In sum, the very nature of European integration 
called for non-conventional interpretation, which did not necessarily follow the existing 
patterns of public law or international law scholarship.
2
 
On the other hand, the birth of this line of thought was also due to the special 
characteristics of the post-World War II European political scene. Although the vision of a 
                                                          
1
 Cf. Article 14 TECSC empowering the High Authority to make binding decisions in order to carry out its tasks; 
Article 27 TECSC requiring member states to delegate one member from their governments to the Council; 
Article 24 TECSC empowering the Assembly to have an open discussion about the High Authority’s general, 
yearly report. 
2
 A vehement critque of these theories is formulated by Robert Schütze when advocating a federal understanding 
of the European Union: ‘In the absence of a theory of federalism beyond the State, European thought invented a 
new word – supranationalism – and proudly announced the European Union to be sui generic. The belief that 
Europe was incomparable ushered in the dark ages of European constitutional theory. (…) In any event, the sui 
generis theory only ever provided a thin veneer in times of constitutional times.’ (Schütze 2009, 3.). 
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unified Europe had already been elaborated by Richard Coundehove-Kalergi and others 
during the interwar period or even earlier (see Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer 2012), sovereignty 
remained a prominent concern of European politics (Harpaz 2011, 77–78). Thus, European 
politics regarded sovereignty as an eminent value, and it determined its general attitude 
toward any supranational integration plans. The designation of the emerging European 
Communities as a federal entity would have raised serious criticism in both politics and 
academia. Therefore, in order to avoid these pitfalls, a non-federal understanding of European 
integration dominated the legal and political discussions from the 1960s. This facilitated the 
emergence of a broad academic discussion without forcing it to deal with very sensitive issues 
such as the future of sovereignty or the prospects of national interest. The study of 
Community law, therefore, has gradually become a narrow professional segment of legal 
scholarship developing its own conceptual tools – losing, however, almost all ambitions to 
address general questions of political nature. 
The late Walter van Gerven’s thesis on the nature of the European Union is a typical 
example of this line of legal scholarship. As for the nature of the EU, the former Advocate 
General argues that the EU is certainly not a state in the Westphalian sense. Although some of 
its features are comparable to conventional states – i.e. it exercises certain competences over a 
specific territory or it is recognized by other states as an actor on the international plane – it 
lacks basic competences that would be necessary for exercising a real power of coercion. 
Without being able to exercise competences in the field of foreign, security and defense 
policy autonomously, that is, independently from the will and interests of the member states, 
the EU cannot fulfill the criteria of independent statehood (van Gerven 2005, 36–39). 
Therefore, it is argued by van Gerven, that the EU should be perceived as a political system or 
a body politic. This is the case, since there is a specific EU institutional setting; the EU has 
governmental powers through which political aims can be realized; the EU also has a certain 
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impact on the distribution of resources; and, lastly, a continuous interaction exists among the 
various actors involved (ibid. 38.). 
What is very telling in van Gerven’s otherwise well-founded concept is that he explicitly 
rejects the federal understanding. Even though this body politic clearly resembles federal 
systems on many points, it cannot be regarded as a federal entity yet. In van Gerven’s eyes, 
the non-federal nature of the EU is due to the lack of the powers of internal and external 
coercion, the tensions between the supranational and member state levels of government, and 
the unsupportive attitudes of member states’ populations (ibid. 60.). In sum, the EU is a multi-
layered political system, but not a real federation.  
One should admit that van Gerven’s anti-federal concerns are all valid points in the context 
of the current European political scene; however, they are not decisive factors with regard to 
the legal understanding of the EU’s constitutional nature. In many European and non-
European federations one can also point out similar tensions between the central and member 
state levels of government, and there are some groups or peoples with clear separationist 
attitudes in most of them. It is apparent that the EU has no comprehensive coercive power 
compared to a ‘traditional state’; however, this does not at all mean that it has no chance to 
promote its own interests through other, sophisticated legal, means.
3
 Thus, the constitutional 
mechanisms of the Treaties enable the EU to enforce the Community interests against the 
member states without a clear transfer of coercive power to it. That being said, although van 
Gerven raises important doubts on the federal nature of the EU, his theses fail to convincingly 
prove why a federalist understanding of the EU is unsuitable ab ovo. On the contrary, they 
mostly point out how fragile these ‘non-federal but sui generis’ approaches are if one 
compares their explicatory value to that of the federal theories. 
                                                          
3
 The most important mechanism is the action for infringement of community law by a member state, that can be 
started by the European Commission and it may be ended in front of the European Court of Justice (Article 258 
TFEU). 
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Yet, contrary to this influential line of thinking, some scholars have intentionally applied 
federal terms in the discussion of the EC’s or EU’s nature in the last decades. These scholarly 
attempts illustrated how fruitfully the federal approach can be applied in this context. These 
efforts focus primarily, albeit not exclusively, on analogies to the US federal doctrine. The 
best examples may be the works of J.H.H. Weiler, Koen Lenaerts or Robert Schütze. For 
instance, in his influential article highlighting the major trends of the early development of 
Community law, Weiler relied on core federal terms – i.e. enumerated powers or preemption 
– and argued for a clear federal understanding of the European Community (Weiler 1990-
1991). Koen Lenaerts – the current Vice-President of the European Court of Justice – also 
applied federal tenets and discussed the main federal features of the European Community on 
a comparative basis (Lenaerts 1998). Recently, from the next generation of European 
scholars, Robert Schütze advocated for a federal-oriented approach of European integration. 
In doing so, he directly linked some provisions of the founding treaties to their US 
counterparts in order to demonstrate the applicability and relevance of this approach. For 
instance, he repeatedly referred to Article 235 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (TEEC)
4
 and its successors as the ‘necessary and proper clause’5 of 
European integration (Schütze 2009, 133–143). 
One may conclude that it is certainly not impossible to discuss EU constitutional evolution 
with the language of federalism even if European public opinion is still reluctant to accept the 
federal scenario. Essentially, it may offer a more suitable conceptual framework than the sui 
generis theories since it makes it possible to learn from the century old federal experiences. 
By contrast, sui generis approaches may only rely on their own, post-modern conceptual 
framework lacking similar historical underpinning. 
                                                          
4
 ‘If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common 
market, one of the objectives of the Community, and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the 
Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament, take the appropriate measures.’ 
5
 The Constitution of the United States of America Art. 1 Sec. 8. 18. 
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The present study intends to assess the development of EU law through federal lenses. In 
essence, it discusses how a main tenet of US federalism – police power6 – can contribute to 
the ongoing discussion of the latest developments in EU constitutionalism. 
 
2. Police power as both a symbol and a cluster of competences 
 
Police power had certainly been one of the key concepts of US constitutional law. It was 
frequently cited in 19
th
 century American jurisprudence (Freund 1904), also resurfacing in 
contemporary US constitutional adjudication and thinking. However, contemporary US 
constitutional law scholarship is rather skeptical about its applicability; indeed, it does not 
refer to it frequently (cf. Nowak-Rotunda 2010, 139). One may argue that state police power 
has lost its relevance in general because of the pervasive influence of constitutional rights on 
state competences. The impact of constitutional rights has considerably reduced the room for 
autonomous state action in the post-World War II period, contributing to the gradual fading of 
its importance.
7
 Further, certain recent developments in Supreme Court case law have treated 
the idea of police power unfavorably, since the states’ right to interfere with public morality 
has also been pushed into the background by constitutional concerns.
8
  
However, police power – although its actual legal value has manifestly been reduced 
during the last century – as a concept of federal constitutional law may still be relevant from 
the aspect of comparative federalism. This is because it can help achieve a better 
understanding of federal structures. That is, the concept of police power may make it possible 
                                                          
6
 Police power is a unique concept originating from the 18
th
 century English legal thinking (Legarre 2007, 748 – 
761). Its meaning is much broader than the simple indication of a government regulatory power of basic 
offenses, but encompasses governmental competences necessary to protect domestic order (for a detailed 
discussion see Freund 1904, 1–23). 
7
 For example: In 1927, the Supreme Court acknowledged that to punish those who abuse freedom of speech is a 
part of state police power (Whitney v. California), however, it overruled this interpretation in judgments dealing 
with the freedom of speech from the 1950’s (Brandenburg v. Ohio). 
8
 For example: In 2003, the Supreme Court banned a Texas bill that made homosexual sodomy a crime on public 
morality basis by relying on the Fourteenth Amendment (Lawrence v. Texas). 
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to shed light on the logic of member states’ competences from their own point of view. 
Indeed, it can provide a different view on a question that was traditionally and prominently 
discussed from the perspective of federal governments. 
Nonetheless, one problematic point should be taken into account. An inherent difficulty of 
police power is its rather broad and, therefore, imprecise meaning. In sum, throughout the last 
two centuries US legal scholarship has applied the concept in various contexts, and, therefore, 
diverse interpretations have been associated with it. Because of this broad penumbral 
meaning, as a first step of our study, two meanings of police power shall be contrasted.  
 
2.1. Police power as a symbol of states’ internal regulatory autonomy 
 
The idea that is described by the term police power in constitutional law scholarship had 
already been an important component of the discourse that inspired the US Constitution of 
1787. During the wide-reaching discussions surrounding the US constitution-making process, 
no one denied that British colonies had their own power to ensure ‘peace, order and good 
government’ on their territory (Legarre 2007, 770–771). Furthermore, the participants of these 
public debates regarded this power as a cornerstone of states’ political existence. That is, the 
idea of inalienable self-government was among the major components of US constitutional 
thinking (ibid. 771–774). Thus, the constitutional system for the emerging United States of 
America was only conceivable if a certain degree of autonomy for the States was guaranteed. 
The Articles of Confederation (1777), predecessor to the US Constitution, afforded a 
prominent place for such a commitment to self-government. Article 2 set forth that: 
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‘Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, 
jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United 
States, in Congress assembled.’ 
 
That being said, the internal legislative autonomy of the states in the emerging Union was a 
undisputed point of the US constitutional thinking. During the Federal Convention in 1787, a 
Connecticut representative – Roger Sherman – even proposed the incorporation of an article 
explicitly referring to police power into the text of the new constitution in order to protect this 
idea. Sherman argued that the federal government should not ‘interfered with the government 
of individual States in any matters of internal police’ (ibid. 776.). That is, police competences, 
whatever this term might have meant at the time, should have remained with the States. 
However, this proposition was rejected, and therefore the original text of the US Constitution 
did not mention the police power of states.  
Yet, it should be borne in mind that the rejection of the above proposal did not at all mean 
that the existence of police powers was not later confirmed by corresponding constitutional 
practice. It simply meant that the original text of the US constitution did not include it – but 
police power, and the idea of self-government, has seriously influenced the public discourse 
on the limits of federal power from the birth of the US constitution (ibid. 777.). This line of 
thinking was incorporated into the text of the constitution in 1789 since the Tenth 
Amendment was designed to emphasize the importance of internal state competences. This 
amendment declared that: 
 
‘The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’ 
 
 9 
The Tenth Amendment finalized the federal structure of the United States since it pointed 
out the fundamental limits of federal legislation (see Casto 1948-1949). The classic principle 
of the enumerated powers receives special emphasis here since the consequence of this clause 
is that those competences that are not explicitly delegated to the federal level remain with the 
states. That is, all other power, essentially competences that are manifest components of 
internal government and administration, are reserved to the states. And, these powers can be 
conceived of as police power in general. In this understanding, indeed, police power is the 
sum of those competences that remain with the states, under their autonomous legislative 
authority. 
 
2.2. Police power as a cluster of competences protecting public interests 
 
Besides the earlier, self-government oriented understanding of police power, another 
interpretation has emerged from the end of 19
th
 century. This understanding is associated with 
specific state powers and competences. Because of the constantly increasing pressure of 
federal legislation, states tried to justify their local rules by relying on the concept of police 
power in order to defend public goods on their territory. The federal government intended to 
justify its jurisdiction from two directions. Firstly, a part of these federal regulations was 
based on the Commerce Clause allowing for the regulation of inter-state commerce by the 
Congress (cf. Cushman 2000). Secondly, the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and its substantive corollaries, such as the protection of property or the principle 
of the liberty of contract, also served as a justification for challenging state acts and 
regulations in the field of public interest (cf. Harrison 1997). In defending their internal 
regulatory autonomy, states argued that their local rules were necessary to protect public 
health, public safety and public morals. Moreover, they also claimed that the protection of 
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these public concerns was an essential component of the states’ police power (Legarre 2007, 
787.). That is, states wanted to thwart the effects of the growing federal legislation by using 
the concept of police power as a cluster of those state competences that cannot be interfered 
with by the federal government. 
The Supreme Court did not elaborate a consistent case law in relation to this approach of 
police power. That is, the case law of the Supreme Court has never defined its precise scope. 
This might be due to the sensitivity of the problem, with special regard to its very political 
nature and the constantly changing historical circumstances. However, two cases may 
illustrate the constraints among which the court had to find a proper balance. The Mugler case 
(Mugler v. Kansas) summarizes the early attitude of the Supreme Court, while the Lochner 
judgment (Lochner v. New York) points out the role of the Fourteenth Amendment when 
police power conflicts with the principles of federal constitutional law.  
In 1887, a dispute between the state of Kansas and a brewery owner raised essential 
questions on the very nature of the states’ legislative power. Peter Mugler, who started 
operating a brewery in 1877, had to shut down the business in 1881 when Kansas enacted 
certain new legal provisions in order to combat alcoholism in its territory. On the one hand, 
the constitution of Kansas was amended with an article generally prohibiting the production 
of alcoholic drinks. On the other hand, the local legislator also enacted a statute that linked the 
production of alcoholic beverages to holding a special license and ordered the fining of those 
producers who did not obtain such a permit. Muglers’ attorney challenged the 
constitutionality of these regulations and argued that Kansas had no proper authority to pass 
them because of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
First of all, the Supreme Court emphasized that its settled case law fully acknowledged the 
states’ competence to regulate purely internal problems being connected to their ‘moral and 
political welfare’ (Mugler v. Kansas, 658). Further, the court argued that this amendment 
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focusing on – inter alia – the requirement of due process of law did not overrule these powers, 
as constitutional amendments were generally not about interfering with states’ internal 
regulatory autonomy. That is, states possess an internal legislative autonomy in general, 
although the Supreme Court stressed that in exercising this autonomy, they must respect the 
authority of the Constitution with special regard to citizens’ rights and the competences of the 
national government (ibid. 663). As for Mugler’s case, the court affirmed the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Kansas and did not find the contested act providing a legal basis for fining 
Mugler unconstitutional. 
Later, this decision became authority since it acknowledged and declared the existence of 
state police power. Some parts of the decision attempted to define the major components of 
police power, contributing thereby to the clarification of this complex and blurry concept. It 
must be noted, however, that the Supreme Court was inconsistent in the explanation because 
it associated a certain range of different definitions to police power (cf. ibid. 658). Interpreted 
through the lens of Mugler, police power is basically about the protection of public health, 
public safety and public morals by state legislation. That is, if a state regulates a segment of 
life that falls into these areas and respects the general constitutional framework, its act in 
question can likely be justified as a valid exercise of state police power. 
This understanding of police power was seriously challenged by the controversial and 
vehemently debated Lochner judgment in 1905 (see Sunstein 1987). The major question of 
the case was if New York had the authority to regulate the working conditions of bakers, 
especially the maximum number of working hours in a week, in order to protect their health 
and safety. That is, the state of New York wanted to justify its labour conditions regulation by 
claiming that it pertained to the exercise of police powers. However, the Supreme Court 
substantially curtailed the potential totality of police power since it argued in favor of liberty 
of contract against the states’ legitimate authority to legislate on general labour conditions 
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prevailing in their territory. As Justice Peckham pointed out, if state regulations on labour 
conditions interfere with the liberty of contract as provided by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the individual liberty had to prevail unless such rules are related to 
very special and peculiar working conditions, as for instance underground mining which was 
seemingly not the case here (Lochner v. New York, 57).  
Hence, this decision put general economic purposes in a prominent place and state public 
interests only came in second. Needless to say, it considerably decreased importance of police 
power on a state level by giving prominence to general economic interests. Following 
Lochner, to exercise state police power in a ‘fair, reasonable and appropriate’ manner, the 
state has to act in a way that is directly linked to public goods. A far and remote relationship, 
as was the case with the New York bakery working conditions regulation, was, in the eyes of 
the court, simply inadequate. 
Following the Lochner decision, the scope of general state police power has been reduced 
even further, since both substantive due process arguments (cf. Lawrence v. Texas) and the 
influence of constitutional rights have eroded it (e.g. Brandenburg v. Ohio). However, the 
existence of police power as such has never been questioned, and states’ internal regulatory 
autonomy in respect to public goods is still a value of US constitutional architecture. 
 
2.3. Summary: multiple, but intertwined layers of meaning 
 
In conclusion, police power is mostly associated with two meanings in US constitutional 
history – a broader concept and a narrower one (Legarre 2007, 785–793.). The broad concept 
is a cornerstone of federalism, since it reaffirms that federal power has its own internal limits 
posed by the jurisdiction of states and their residual sovereignty. In this sense, police power 
does have a symbolical meaning as it exposes an inherent limitation of Congress’s powers. At 
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this point, not the precise components and parts of police power that are important, but its 
message: federal power cannot be unlimited, but as to be balanced with the fact that states 
retained a part of their original sovereignty which they will never give up since a part of 
public goods can only be protected this way. 
The narrow concept reflects a different approach. It sheds light on the fact that states’ 
jurisdiction in a federal system comprises at least three important areas: the protection of 
public health, public safety and public morals. Thus, it points out some components of states’ 
residuary sovereignty by putting emphasis on the public good. Obviously, these competences 
have been under a strong pressure from the beginning of the 19
th
 century stemming from 
various sources, e.g. the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, or the pervasive effect 
of constitutional rights. But, their existence could never be denied; it was merely their proper 
scope that has been up for discussion. 
 
3. Police power in the Post-Lisbon constitutional architecture?  
 
3.1. Article 4 (1) and (2) TEU: a European approach to police power 
 
The Lisbon Treaty that, among other objectives, aimed to restructure the system of Union 
competences by simplifying the pre-Lisbon setting (see: von Bogdandy-Bast 2002, 229–251) 
introduced qualitatively new provisions setting forth precise rules for delimiting the 
competences between the Union and the member state levels of government. Both the TEU 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contain relevant 
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provisions,
9
 but Article 4 paras (1) and (2) TEU may have a prominent role to play in this 
discussion.  
As for these articles, the first point that should be emphasized is the lack of any 
antecedents in the earlier treaty versions. It can generally be stated that the Lisbon articles on 
the division of competences originate from either some earlier articles or the case law of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) (cf. Lenaerts-Van Nuffel 2011, 125–126). However, these 
two articles do not exhibit such a close connection to the constitutional past of the EU, and it 
makes their appearance in the corpus of the TEU even more surprising. Generally, it can be 
argued that Article 4 paras (1) and (2) TEU indicate a clear shift in the constitutional 
philosophy of the EU with respect to the vertical division of powers. It is so because both of 
paragraphs are devoted to the protection of member state powers. That is, they are centered on 
the legislative activities of member states.  
One should not forget that prior to the Maastricht Treaty there were no provisions in the 
founding treaties dealing either with the existence of member state powers or their precise 
scope. They rather focused on the exercise of the Community powers, then later on Union 
competences.
10
 Following the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, the concept of subsidiarity 
appeared in the corpus of EU constitutional law, but it constituted much more of a political 
response to the fears of certain member states regarding an emerging federative union than a 
real and functioning legal remedy against the potential misuse of Community powers (cf. 
Davies 2006). Therefore, these articles illustrate to what extent the constitutional philosophy 
of the EU has changed in relation to the question of federalism. The nature and scope of 
                                                          
9
 Interestingly the EU constitutional order has no single competence clause that would regulate the division of 
competences in a single chapter. Actually, Articles 4 and 5 TEU, Articles 2 to 6 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU 
contain relevant provisions and their entirety can be conceived of as the ‘competence clause’ of the EU. 
10
 It should be mentioned that those provisions that enlisted certain exceptions under the principle of free 
movement of goods on the basis of – inter alia – public morality, public policy, public security and protection of 
health and life cannot be regarded as antecedents since they did not deal with the competences of member states 
but they provided general grounds to justify those member state measures that may infringe this principle. (see 
Article 36 TFEU). 
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member state competences have to be emphasized only in federal structures; in other, 
fundamentally non-federal constitutional orders it is simply unnecessary.  
Moreover – and this is the most striking feature from the aspect of the present study – one 
can easily recognize that both articles reflect an understanding of member state powers that is 
almost identical to the US interpretation of police power. One may even conclude that they 
are intended to be the “police power clauses” of the EU treaties. 
First of all, Article 4 para (1) TEU must be analysed in detail. It declares that: 
 
‘In accordance with Article 5, competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties 
remain with the Member States.’  
 
It can hardly be denied that this provision shares the same federal commitment that the 
Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution exemplifies. Obviously there are apparent 
differences between the two provisions. Firstly, the phrasing of Article 4 para (1) TEU is not 
as sophisticated as in the case of the US Amendment, since it is nothing more than a simple 
statement on the position of powers not conferred upon the EU. Secondly, as compared to its 
US counterpart, this Article does not contain any reference to the people, but merely mentions 
the member states as depositaries of these powers.  
Yet, the meaning is definitely the same in a constitutional sense. A part of the EU member 
states’ competences is not transferred to the supranational level, to the EU government. Thus, 
EU member states retain a part of their sovereignty irrespective of the strengthening of the 
supranational level of government. Put another way, one can find a clear reference to a basic 
tenet of federalism as determined by the symbolical meaning of police power. In the eyes of 
the European constitution-maker, the powers of the Union level are certainly not unlimited, 
but rather they are restricted by the residuary sovereignty of member states. That being said, 
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contrary to the manifest differences on the surface, this conviction on the limited nature of the 
powers of the supranational level is a common point in both the US and the post-Lisbon EU 
constitutionalism. Basically, the symbolical understanding of police power earlier analysed is 
reflected in this new article. 
Article 4 para (2) TEU implies even more surprising conclusions when compared to the 
narrower approach of US police power. Indeed, this provision delimits the core of the political 
and constitutional existence of the member states; that is, it defines those competences that 
cannot be overruled by acts of the Union. In terms of the present analysis, the second sentence 
of this Article may gain particular importance. It obliges the EU to respect the member states 
(i.) essential state functions in general, and it mentions (ii.) the ensuring of territorial integrity, 
(iii.) the maintenance of law and order and (iv.) the safeguarding of national interest as major 
components. Although the constitution-maker did not specify the exact scope of these powers, 
these are the basic state competences necessary for territorial administration. 
It is worth mentioning that Working Group V of the European Constitutional Convention 
originally had a different, essentially broader vision when drafting this provision. It argued 
that national identity as a constitutional concept consists of two main components. The first 
one focuses on ‘the fundamental structures and essential functions’ of a member state, 
whereas the second one concentrates on ‘basic public policy choices and social values’ (Final 
Report 2002, 11). However, perhaps as a sign of European realpolitik, the final draft entirely 
neglected the public policy choices and social values components in the text, and it only 
contained references to the essential state functions. 
It is striking again to what extent the second sentence of Article 4 para (2) TEU echoes or 
mirrors police power when conceived of in a narrow sense – that is, as a cluster of state 
powers related to the protection of public goods in its territory. Essentially, no one can deny 
that the aim of this Article is to define, as broadly as possible, those legislative areas that 
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cannot be dissociated from the member states in this configuration of power sharing. That is, 
the EU constitution-maker followed the same approach as the US constitutional discourse 
when trying to specify which state powers are needed to protect public health, public safety 
and public morals. Basically, the terms of ‘essential state functions’ and the ‘maintenance of 
law and order’ may comprise all those competences that have been identified as police powers 
in front of the US Supreme Court from the second half of the 19
th
 century. A direct reference 
to public morals is actually missing from text of this article, but, theoretically, the word 
‘order’ could be interpreted in this sense by the ECJ if necessary. 
 
3.2. The ECJ and the individual, country-specific constitutional identity: opening the door 
for police power in EU context? 
 
Today, it is impossible to say whether or not Article 4 paras (1) and (2) play a similar role 
in the future of EU constitutionalism that police power had played on the other side of the 
Atlantic. One may direct attention to the apparent similarities, but the judicial interpretation of 
these articles is still an open question. That is, the ECJ will play a prominent role in shaping 
the understanding of the exclusive member state competences, in establishing a fair balance 
between the Union and member state interests in order to create a fair and efficient system of 
division of powers. 
The attitude of the ECJ toward member state competences as they are conceived in these 
two articles cannot be foreseen due to many reasons. Chief among these reasons is the actual 
uncertainty of the European political scene, as the ongoing European debt crisis profoundly 
changed the general attitude towards integration. And, this transformation may have a serious 
effect on the assessment of basic constitutional problems, such as member states’ inalienable 
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powers. However, in examining the settled case law of the ECJ, there is one decision that may 
yield some insights for predicting the ECJ’s future approach in this field. 
As regards state police powers, the most important decision of the ECJ may be the Omega 
Spielhallen (Omega-Spielhallen). While this case had many implications, only one aspect has 
to be mentioned in the present context. The case, which started in Germany and gained 
particular importance, explicitly raised the question whether the principle of freedom to 
provide services can be restricted by referring to specific fundamental constitutional values – 
human dignity in this case – as a public policy choice. Human dignity has a prominent place 
in German constitutionalism, and its protection is one of the basic goals of the entire legal 
order. Therefore, it plays a special role beyond comparison with other member states.  
In other words, the main dilemma of this case can be reformulated by using the term of 
police power. Does the Federal Republic of Germany have the right to provide a special, high-
level protection to human dignity in order to protect a prominent value of German 
constitutionalism, even against the principles of the European Union? Essentially, the police 
powers of Germany in the field of public morals had to be weighed against EU basic 
principles. The ECJ answered the question affirmatively, declaring: 
 
‘[…] that the specific circumstances which may justify recourse to the concept of public 
policy may vary from one country to another and from one era to another. The competent 
national authorities must therefore be allowed a margin of discretion within the limits 
imposed by the Treaty […]’ (Omega-Spielhallen, para 31) 
 
That is, in the Omega Spielhallen the ECJ theoretically acknowledged the existence of 
public policy objectives varying from one country to another. Moreover, it even accepted that 
these can be protected by country-specific restrictions, and if these do not conflict with some 
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general principles of EU law – such as non-discrimination and proportionality (Omega-
Spielhallen, paras 29 and 38) – they may even be valid under EU law. 
Essentially, the argumentation of the ECJ in Omega Spielhallen certainly indicates one 
point. The ECJ is open to accept the existence of police powers if they are justified under the 
strict scrutiny of substantive and procedural requirements. Of course, this argumentation 
remains silent about the future interpretation of Article 4 paras (1) and (2) TEU, it only points 
out the starting position of the ECJ that may obviously change due to other relevant 
considerations. 
  
4. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, two theses can be formulated at the end of this analysis that discussed the 
reception of police power in EU constitutional law. First of all, no one can seriously question 
the usefulness of this federal concept in the better understanding of EU law. The idea of 
police power is very useful for highlighting the broad, so to say comparative, context of 
Article 4 paras (1) and (2) TEU, and, therefore it contributes to their in-depth understanding. 
Moreover, the more than two hundred years of constitutional history regarding police 
power, be it a symbol of residuary sovereignty or a cluster of specific powers, can also help in 
projecting the prospects of EU member states within the conditions of an emerging federal 
polity. Comparative constitutional history teaches us that the real room for member states to 
exercise their own competences in a federal system is determined by a case-by-case approach. 
That is, it is the field of a never-ending constitutional controversy between the supranational 
and member state levels of government, in which both sides try to preserve, and if it is 
possible, broaden and strengthen their powers. And, obviously, federal supreme courts have 
always been key actors in this process.  
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Therefore, we may conclude that the question of what kind of constitutional future the EU 
member states are looking ahead to in a more-and-more federalized EU can only be answered 
in the longer run by analysing the relevant case-law of the ECJ. Thus, we are looking forward 
to the first judgments of the ECJ interpreting Article 4 paras (1) and (2) TEU. Until such time, 
all legal literature regarding this problem is nothing more than a simple, but fascinating 
speculation. 
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